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ABSTRACT
Social media platforms allow users to share their creative
works with the world. Users take great advantage of this
functionality, as Facebook, Instagram, Flickr, Snapchat, and
WhatsApp users alone uploaded 1.8 billion photos per day in 2014.
Under the terms of service and terms of use agreements of most
U.S. based social media platforms, users retain ownership of this
content, since they only grant social media platforms nonexclusive
licenses to their content. While nonexclusive licenses protect users
vis-à-vis the social media platforms, these licenses preclude social
media platforms from bringing copyright infringement claims on
behalf of their users against infringers of user content under the
Copyright Act of 1976. Since the average cost of litigating a
copyright infringement case might be as high as two million
dollars, the average social media user cannot protect his or her
content against copyright infringers. To remedy this issue,
Congress should amend 17 U.S.C. § 501 to allow social media
platforms to bring copyright infringement claims against those who
infringe their users’ content. Through this amendment, Congress
would create a new protection for social media users while
ensuring that users retain ownership over the content they create.

INTRODUCTION
An estimated 2.34 billion people used social media in 2016, and
this number is predicted to increase to 2.95 billion by 2020.1 Social media
users are logging onto systems designed to facilitate the sharing and
communication of user created content,2 and they are prolific sharers.3
†
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Physics, Fordham University, May, 2015.
1
Number of Social Media Users Worldwide from 2010 to 2020 (in Billions),
STATISTA, https://www.statista.com/statistics/278414/number-of-worldwide-socialnetwork-users/ (last visited Oct. 28, 2016).
2
The Sedona Conference, The Sedona Conference Glossary: E-Discovery &
Digital Information Management (Fourth Edition), 15 SEDONA CONF. J. 305, 324
(2014) (defining “social media” as “[i]nternet applications which permit individuals
or organizations to interactively share and communicate”). Additionally, the
Sedona Conference defines a “social network” as “[a] group of people that use the
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Facebook, Instagram, Flickr, Snapchat, and WhatsApp users alone
“upload[ed] 1.8 billion images . . . every day” in 2014.4 A substantial
proportion of this shared content is copyrightable subject matter like
pictures and videos.5 This proliferation of copyrightable subject matter
enables individuals to connect and stay apprised of each other’s lives, but it
also provides potential copyright infringers ample material to copy and
illegally share.6 Such unauthorized sharing infringes the “interests of
authors and inventors in the control and exploitation of their writings and
discoveries . . . .”7
Currently, because social media users hold the exclusive rights to
their content, they are the only actors capable of counteracting the
infringement of their copyrighted material.8 While social media platforms
should not be the exclusive rights holders to content users create,9 platforms

Internet to share and communicate, either professionally or personally, in a public
setting typically based on a specific theme or interest.” Id. Informatively, Facebook
is explicitly identified later in this definition as “a popular social network that
allows people to connect to friends . . . anywhere in the world in order to share . . .
pictures . . . .” Id.
3
See Amount of User-Generated Content Created per Online Minute in 2012, by
Platform, STATISTA, https://www.statista.com/statistics/252485/new-contentgenerated-by-users-per-minute-by-platform/ (last visited Oct. 28, 2016) (illustrating
that Facebook users shared an average of 684,478 pieces of content and Twitter
users tweeted an average of 100,000 Tweets per minute in 2012).
4
Jim Edwards, Planet Selfie: We’re Now Posting a Staggering 1.8 Billion Photos
Every Day, BUS. INSIDER (May 28, 2014, 11:30 AM), http://www.business
insider.com/were-now-posting-a-staggering-18-billion-photos-to-social-mediaevery-day-2014-5.
5
See 17 U.S.C. §§ 102(a)(5)–(6) (2012) (recognizing pictures and movies are
copyrightable subject matter if they are sufficiently creative and original).
6
See Oliver Herzfeld & Marc Aaron Melzer, Fair Use in the Age of Social Media,
FORBES (May 26, 2016, 9:34 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/oliverherzfeld/
2016/05/26/fair-use-in-the-age-of-social-media/#26cbfcb826cd (linking the
dramatic increase in social media usage to an increase in questions surrounding
copyright infringement).
7
Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984).
8
See 17 U.S.C. § 501(b) (2012) (allowing only exclusive rights holders “to institute
an action for any infringement of that particular right committed while he or she is
the owner of it”); see also, e.g., Terms of Use, INSTAGRAM, https://help.
instagram.com/478745558852511 [hereinafter Instagram TOU] (last visited Sept.
24, 2016) (“Instagram does not claim ownership of any Content that you post on or
through the Service. Instead, you hereby grant to Instagram a non-exclusive, fully
paid and royalty-free, transferable, sub-licensable, worldwide license to use the
Content that you post on or through the Service . . . .”).
9
Cf. Laura Wagner, Is Facebook Suppressing Politically Conservative Content?,
NPR: THE TWO-WAY
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are better situated than individual users to bear the extreme costs associated
with copyright infringement litigation.10 This leaves an enforcement
paradox: those who can legally bring copyright infringement claims are
economically unable to do so, and those who are economically equipped are
legally unable to bring such claims. The practical effect of the paradox is
that it leaves users’ content unprotected.
One solution to this paradox would be to force social media users to
transfer their exclusive rights to social media platforms to protect their
content. However, such a forced transfer would leave users vulnerable to
predatory terms of service agreements. Instead, Congress should intervene
to protect user content in this expanding technological and commercial
realm by following the example it set for itself nearly twenty years ago
when it passed the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) to amend
the Copyright Act of 1976 (Copyright Act) to balance the interests of
content owners and content providers.11 Congress should amend 17 U.S.C.
§ 501 to allow social media platforms to bring suit as a nonexclusive rights
holder for the infringement of users’ content. Congress should limit this
new right to scenarios where the nonexclusive rights holder is a social
media platform and the infringed content belongs to the platform’s user.
Such an amendment would “balance[] the interests of content owners, online and other service providers, and information users to foster the
continued development of electronic commerce and the growth of the
Internet,”12 thereby advancing the goals of the DMCA and the Copyright
Act in the realm of social media.
This proposed amendment raises the question of why social media
platforms would want or use this right. After discussion of social media
platforms’ terms of service and modern day copyright law in the United
States in Parts I and II, Part III of this Article seeks to answer this question
by showing the negative economic impact poor user protections can have on
(May 10, 2016, 6:06 PM), http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2016/05/10/
477525204/is-facebook-suppressing-politically-conservative-content (noting the
negative reaction to social media sites controlling – or at the very least influencing
– what content is displayed to users). Social media platforms would exercise said
control over the surfacing of user content if they were the exclusive rights holders
of users’ content. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2012).
10
Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Copyright Infringement Markets, 113 COLUM. L. REV.
2277, 2280 (2013) (“As of 2011, the average cost of litigating a copyright
infringement case through trial, for either plaintiff or defendant—and excluding
judgment and awards—was estimated to range from $384,000 to a staggering $2
million.”).
11
Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105–304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998)
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.) (“An Act to amend title 17,
United States Code . . . .”).
12
H.R. Rep. No. 105-551, pt. 2, at 21 (1998) (Conf. Rep.).
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social media platforms. Thus, by increasing the rights held by social media
platforms, Congress can increase the copyright protection enjoyed by social
media users.

I. ANALYZING SOCIAL MEDIA TERMS OF SERVICE
The enforcement paradox has its roots in the terms of service and
terms of use documents that control interactions among social media users,
and between users and the social media platform. The terms of service
documents for Facebook,13 Instagram,14 Snapchat,15 Twitter,16 and
YouTube17 share a common structure: individual users retain ownership of
the content they create and share on the social media platform, but they
grant a nonexclusive license to the social media platform to use their
content. However, there are slight differences in the scope of the grants
between social media platforms. YouTube, potentially in an effort to
promote fair use, expands this nonexclusive license to also allow other
YouTube users “to access [user’s] Content through the Service, and to use,
13

Statement of Rights and Responsibilities, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/
terms [hereinafter Facebook TOS] (last visited Sept. 24, 2016) (“You own all of the
content and information you post on Facebook, and you can control how it is shared
through your privacy and application settings. In addition: 1. For content that is
covered by intellectual property rights . . . [subject to privacy settings] you grant us
a non-exclusive . . . license to use any IP content that you post on or in connection
with Facebook (IP License).”) (emphasis added).
14
Instagram TOU, supra note 8 (“Instagram does not claim ownership of any
Content that you post on or through the Service. Instead, you hereby grant to
Instagram a non-exclusive, fully paid and royalty-free, transferable, sub-licensable,
worldwide license to use the Content that you post on or through the Service,
subject to the Service's Privacy Policy.”) (emphasis added).
15
Snap Inc. Terms of Service, SNAP INC., https://www.snap.com/en-US/terms/
[hereinafter Snap TOS] (last visited Sept. 24, 2016) (“Many of our Services let you
create, upload, post, send, receive, and store content. When you do that, you retain
whatever ownership rights in that content you had to begin with. But you grant us a
license to use that content.”).
16
Twitter Terms of Service, TWITTER, https://twitter.com/tos?lang=en#content (last
visited Sept. 24, 2016) (“By submitting, posting or displaying Content on or
through the Services, you grant us a worldwide, non-exclusive, royalty-free license
(with the right to sublicense) to use, copy, reproduce, process, adapt, modify,
publish, transmit, display and distribute such Content in any and all media or
distribution methods (now known or later developed.”) (emphasis added).
17
Terms of Service, YOUTUBE, https://www.youtube.com/static?template=terms
(last visited Sept. 24, 2016) (“For clarity, you retain all of your ownership rights in
your Content. However, by submitting Content to YouTube, you hereby grant
YouTube a worldwide, non-exclusive, royalty-free, sublicensable and transferable
license to use, reproduce, distribute, prepare derivative works of, display, and
perform the Content in connection with the Service . . . .”) (emphasis added).
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reproduce, distribute, display and perform such Content as permitted
through the functionality of the Service and under these Terms of
Service.”18 Interestingly, Snapchat, which is known for its ephemeral
messaging service, retains the most rights and controls to its users’
content.19 However, even Snapchat’s far-reaching control only extends to
“crowd-sourced Services [that] are inherently public and chronicle matters
of public interest,”20 or to content that others can likely reproduce without
copyright infringement.21 Thus, the terms of service agreements that users
must agree to prior to using social media platforms22 give platforms mere
nonexclusive licenses over the content that is most vulnerable to copyright
infringement.
Along with common license grants, the terms of service agreements
also provide similar limits on social media platforms’ available actions in
response to copyright infringement. U.S. based social media platforms
stress the importance of user’s privacy and rights and delineate specific
methods to protect the privacy and the rights of its users.23 For instance,
platforms reserve the right to remove content. Facebook reserves the right to
“remove any content or information [a user] post[s] on Facebook if
[Facebook] believe[s] that it violates this Statement or [Facebook’s]
policies.”24 One way a user violates Facebook’s Statement is by “post[ing]
content or tak[ing] any action on Facebook that infringes or violates
someone else's rights or otherwise violates the law.”25 Under the terms of
service, this reserved right is permissive.26 Thus, absent some other legal
requirement, the terms of service do not obligate the social media platforms
18

Id.
See Snap TOS, supra note 15 (granting Snapchat “a perpetual license to create
derivative works from, promote, exhibit, broadcast, syndicate, sublicense, publicly
perform, and publicly display” what Snapchat deems to be crowd-sourced content).
20
Id.
21
See infra note 77 and accompanying text (explaining fair use).
22
See, e.g., Facebook TOS, supra note 13 (“By using or accessing the Facebook
Services, you agree to this Statement, as updated from time to time in accordance
with Section 13 below.”).
23
E.g., id. (stating that“[user] privacy is very important to us” and later devoting a
section of the terms of service to “Protecting Other People’s [including other
user’s] Rights”).
24
E.g., id.
25
Id. Other social media platforms also list the sharing of material that would
constitute copyright infringement to be a violation of the platform’s terms of
service. E.g., Instagram TOU, supra note 8 (users may not post content that
“violate[s], misappropriate[s] or infringe[s] on the rights of any third party,
including, without limitation, privacy rights, publicity rights, copyrights, trademark
and/or other intellectual property rights”).
26
Facebook TOS, supra note 13 (“We can remove [infringing content].”)
(emphasis added).
19
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to remove user content.27 However, this permissive right only enables
social media platforms to remove content posted onto their platform, it does
not extend to instances where content is copied from their platform and
republished outside their platform.28 If a user posts his or her original
content (e.g., a creative photo) onto Facebook, and a commercially
motivated individual sees the photo, copies it off of Facebook and then
republishes the non-transformed photo on some website outside of the
Facebook platform without the Facebook user’s permission, nothing in the
Facebook terms of service permits Facebook to take any action to combat
this clear case of copyright infringement.
In short, the terms of service documents set up the contractual
relationship between the social media platforms and their users.29 Through
this relationship, users retain ownership of their content while the social
media platforms are granted a nonexclusive license to the content.30 If users
infringe on the copyright rights of others on the social media platforms, then
the social media sites may take action.31 If the infringement takes place
outside of the social media platform, then the terms of service do not
provide the social media platform with any method to protect the rights of
their users.32

II. ANALYZING THE COPYRIGHT ACT OF 1976
When paired with current copyright law, the nonexclusive licenses
granted in social media platforms’ terms of service agreements generate the
legal portion of the enforcement paradox. The Copyright Act grants certain
exclusive rights over copyrighted material, and only the holders of these
exclusive rights may bring suits for copyright infringement under the Act.

A. Copyright Holder’s Rights
The Copyright Act protects “original works of authorship fixed in
any tangible medium of expression.”33 There are three distinct requirements
Snap TOS, supra note 15 (“Although Snap Group Limited reserves the right to
review all content that appears on the Services and to remove any content that
violates these Terms, we do not necessarily review all of it. So we cannot—and do
not—take responsibility for any content that others provide through the Services.”).
28
See generally Facebook TOS, supra note 13 (providing remedies for copyright
infringement only when the infringing content is posted within the Facebook
platform).
29
E.g., Snap TOS, supra note 15.
30
See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
31
See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
32
See id. (limiting applicability of the terms of service document to conduct
performed on the social media platform).
33
17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(5) (2012).
27

No. 1]

DUKE LAW & TECHNOLOGY REVIEW

259

within this short clause: the work must be a work of authorship, the work
must be original, and the work must be fixed.34 As defined by the Act,
“[w]orks of authorship include . . . pictorial, graphic, and sculptural
works.”35 As defined by the Supreme Court, a work is original when said
“work [is] independently created by the author (as opposed to copied from
other works), and [when] it possesses at least some minimal degree of
creativity.”36 Lastly, a work is fixed when “the work [is] embodied in a
medium, i.e., placed in a medium such that it can be perceived, reproduced,
etc., from that medium . . . , and [remains] thus embodied ‘for a period of
more than transitory duration . . . .”37 So long as a work published onto a
social media platform contains a modicum of creativity, it is now widely
recognized as deserving the protection of the Copyright Act.38
The Copyright Act grants “copyright holders . . . the exclusive
rights of 1) reproduction, 2) making derivative works, 3) distribution, 4)
public performance, 5) and public display.”39 Each of these individual rights
can exist independent of the other rights, as the term “copyright owner” is
34

See id. (describing characteristics works need to eligible for copyright
protection).
35
Id.
36
Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991) (quoting 1
M. NIMMER & D. NIMMER, COPYRIGHT §§ 2.01[A], [B] (1990)).
37
Cartoon Network LP, LLLP v. CSC Holdings, Inc., 536 F.3d 121, 127 (2d Cir.
2008).
38
See, e.g., Sharon Roberg-Rodriquez, ‘I Found it on Twitter’ — Not a Defense in
Copyright Case, LAW360 (Oct. 7, 2014, 10:08 AM) http://www.law360.com/article
s/582169/i-found-it-on-twitter-not-a-defense-in-copyright-case
(recognizing
material posted on social media as worthy of copyright protection).
39
Jennifer Jenkins, In Ambiguous Battle: The Promise (and Pathos) of Public
Domain Day, 2014, 12 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 1, 8 (2013). This listing is paring
down of 17 U.S.C. § 106, which is admittedly long but important to list in full since
the variety of material shared on social media platforms invokes all of the
enumerated rights:
“Subject to sections 107 through 122, the owner of copyright under this
title has the exclusive rights to do and to authorize any of the following:
(1) to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords; (2) to
prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work; (3) to
distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the public by
sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending; (4) in
the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works,
pantomimes, and motion pictures and other audiovisual works, to perform
the copyrighted work publicly; (5) in the case of literary, musical,
dramatic, and choreographic works, pantomimes, and pictorial, graphic, or
sculptural works, including the individual images of a motion picture or
other audiovisual work, to display the copyrighted work publicly; and (6)
in the case of sound recordings, to perform the copyrighted work publicly
by means of a digital audio transmission.” 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2012).
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defined in the Copyright Act as “with respect to any one of the exclusive
rights comprised in a copyright, refers to the owner of that particular
right.”40 Thus, there can be multiple copyright owners for one copyrighted
piece if the exclusive rights to that copyrighted piece have been transferred
by the original creator to multiple owners41 The Copyright Act explicitly
defines a “transfer of copyright ownership” as only “an assignment,
mortgage, exclusive license, or any other conveyance, alienation, or
hypothecation of a copyright or of any of the exclusive rights comprised in
a copyright . . . .”42 While exclusive licenses can transfer copyright
ownership, the Copyright Act explicitly excises nonexclusive licenses from
the types of legal vehicles that constitute a transfer of copyright
ownership.43 Since social media users only grant social media platforms
nonexclusive licenses to use their content, the users do not transfer any
copyright ownership to the social media platforms when they agree to the
platforms’ terms of services.
This explicit excising of nonexclusive licenses from the list of legal
vehicles that can transfer copyright ownership has added importance
because, unlike other areas of copyright law,44 courts have remained faithful
to the statutory language defining transfers of copyright ownership.45 In
Minden Pictures, Inc. v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., for example, the Ninth

40

17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012).
See Gardner v. Nike, Inc., 279 F.3d 774, 778 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting 3
MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 10.01[A])
(describing how multiple licensees can be copyright owners of one copyrighted
work if each licensee holds an exclusive license to a separate copyright right).
42
Id. (emphasis added).
43
Id. (“[A] ‘transfer of copyright ownership’ is an assignment, mortgage, exclusive
license, or any other conveyance, alienation, or hypothecation of a copyright or of
any of the exclusive rights comprised in a copyright, whether or not it is limited in
time or place of effect, but not including a nonexclusive license.”) (emphasis
added).
44
See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 936–37
(2005) (expanding secondary liability for copyright infringement to include liability
for inducement of copyright infringement even though the Copyright Act contains
no mention of secondary liability); Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464
U.S. 417, 434–35 (1984) (recognizing that “[t]he Copyright Act does not expressly
render anyone liable for infringement committed by another,” yet divining that the
“absence of such express language in the copyright statute does not preclude the
imposition of liability for copyright infringements on certain parties who have not
themselves engaged in the infringing activity”).
45
Minden Pictures, Inc. v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 795 F.3d 997, 1003 (9th Cir.
2015) (discussing the history of the Copyright Act of 1976 and holding that an
owner of a mere nonexclusive license cannot bring a copyright infringement suit).
41
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Circuit46 refused to expand the definition of “copyright owners” to include
nonexclusive license holders.47 This is a common theme amongst circuit
courts. Few, if any, cases recognize a nonexclusive license as giving its
holder the requisite standing to bring a copyright infringement suit.48
As noted by Minden, the logic behind not recognizing a
nonexclusive license as a transfer of copyright ownership “is that such a
licensee has no more than ‘a privilege that protects him from a claim of
infringement by the owner’ of the copyright.”49 Minden notes that because a
nonexclusive license grants a licensee “rights only vis-à-vis the licensor, not
vis-à-vis the world, he or she has no legal right to exclude others from using
the copyrighted work . . . .”50 Since the social media platforms are mere
nonexclusive rights holders, they are not copyright owners with regards to
the user-generated content shared on their platforms.

B. Enforcing the Infringement of Exclusive Rights Under the
Copyright Act
Social media platforms’ statuses as nonexclusive rights holders (and
therefore non-copyright owners) preclude the platforms from bringing
copyright infringement suits under current copyright law. Currently, only
“[t]he legal or beneficial owner of an exclusive right under a copyright is
entitled, subject to the requirements of section 411, to institute an action for
any infringement of that particular right committed while he or she is the
owner of it.”51 Standing to bring infringement suits is limited to exclusive
rights holders because only those who “who violate[] any of the exclusive
rights of the copyright owner as provided by sections 106 through 122 . . .
46

Interestingly, the Ninth Circuit created the notion of vicarious liability for
copyright infringement, even though the statutory text of the Copyright Act never
imposed secondary liability for copyright infringement. See A&M Records, Inc. v.
Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1022–23 (9th Cir. 2001) (limiting Sony, which
created the concept of secondary liability for copyright infringement when it
created contributory infringement, to create a new form of secondary copyright
infringement called vicarious liability).
47
Minden, 795 F.3d at 1003 (“However, a party granted a mere ‘nonexclusive
license’—as, in this case, Wiley's license to reprint a copyrighted photograph in a
textbook—cannot bring an infringement suit.” (citing 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012); then
citing Eden Toys, Inc. v. Florelee Undergarment Co., Inc., 697 F.2d 27, 32 (2d Cir.
1982))).
48
See McNeese Photography, L.L.C. v. Access Midstream Partners, L.P., No.
CIV-14-503-D, 2016 WL 1312630, at *4 (W.D. Okla. Apr. 4, 2016) (“[Minden]
restated the law as it had been concerning standing in the copyright context.”).
49
Minden, 795 F.3d at 1004 (quoting W. Elec. Co. v. Pacent Reproducer Corp., 42
F.2d 116, 119 (2d Cir. 1930)).
50
Id.
51
17 U.S.C. § 501(b) (2012) (emphasis added).
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[are] infringer[s] of the copyright or right of the author, as the case may
be.”52 The importance of holding an exclusive right is that such a right is
enforceable as a property right, not just as a contract right.53 While
exclusive licenses are not so restrictive as to preclude two simultaneous
holders from claiming an exclusive right, social media platforms do not
interpret the rights gained under terms of service agreements to be
exclusive.54 Instead, users retain ownership of the copyright protecting their
original subject matter. Thus, under existing copyright law, social media
platforms lack the requisite ownership rights to bring an action for the
infringement of their users’ content. Instead, the individual and legally
inept social media users who post their content hold these rights.55 This
leads to the under-enforcement of copyright infringement of social media
users’ content.

III. ALLOWING SOCIAL MEDIA PLATFORMS TO BRING
COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT CLAIMS
To address this under-enforcement, Congress should amend 17
U.S.C. § 501(b) to allow, but not force, social media platforms, as
nonexclusive license holders, to bring suits for the copyright infringement
of the user-generated content that the platforms have nonexclusive licenses
to. By modifying a single sentence of § 501(b) to provide: “The legal or
beneficial owner of an exclusive right under a copyright, or,
notwithstanding anything else in this title, a social media platform that
holds a nonexclusive license to its user’s exclusive right under a copyright,
is entitled, subject to the requirements of section 411, to institute an action
for any infringement of that particular right committed while he or she is the
owner of it,” Congress can make use of the preexisting copyright
protections to protect copyrighted material in the developing social media
industry. Such an amendment will enable social media platforms to protect

52

Id. § 501(a).
Minden, 795 F.3d at 1004–05. As a normative matter, this makes sense. If I know
I have exclusive ownership of X, and I see you with X, I know you have infringed
on my ownership rights to X. Alternatively, if I know I merely have nonexclusive
ownership of X, and I see you with X, you have not infringed on my ownership
rights to X. Further, in the nonexclusive ownership scenario, no infringement can
be assumed a priori.
54
Defendant Instagram, LLC’s Reply In Support Of Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's
First Amended Complaint Pursuant to F.R.C.P. 12(b)(1) & 12(b)(6), Rodriguez v.
Instagram, LLC, 2013 WL 2247056 (N.D. Cal. May 1, 2013) (No. 12-cv-06482WHA) (analyzing the lack of transferability of property rights through the granting
of nonexclusive licenses to content in social media Terms of Service documents).
55
For further discussion regarding why users retain these rights, see supra Part
II.A.
53
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their users’ rights in the ever-growing social media industry and is
consistent with Congress’s interest in regulating new Internet technologies.

A. Social Media Platforms Benefit from This Amendment
First, social media platforms should support this amendment
because it will enable the platforms to protect the rights of their users,
which is good for users and good for social media platforms’ bottom lines.
As exemplified by the Facebook Terms of Service, social media strive to
protect the rights and privacy of their users.56 Yet a staggering “69% of
adults say they are not confident that records of their activity maintained by
the social media sites they use will remain private and secure,”57 while
“66% say they are not confident that records of their activity collected by
the online video sites they use will remain private and secure.”58 While this
unease has not yet led to a mass exodus from social media platforms, 59
Twitter’s inability to control the content posted on its platform and its
inability to protect its user’s rights recently led to extreme public backlash.60
This public backlash corresponded with users leaving the platform because
of Twitter’s inability to protect their rights.61 While correlation does not

See Facebook TOS, supra note 13 (noting, among other things, that “[user]
privacy is very important to us” and “[w]e respect other people's rights, and expect
you to do the same”).
57
Mary Madden & Lee Raine, Americans’ Attitudes About Privacy, Security and
Surveillance, PEW RESEARCH CTR. (May 20, 2015), http://www.pewinternet.org/
2015/05/20/americans-attitudes-about-privacy-security-and-surveillance/ (emphasis
omitted).
58
Id. (emphasis omitted).
59
See id. (“At the time of the mid-2014 survey, the vast majority of respondents –
91% – had not made any changes to their internet or cellphone use to avoid having
their activities tracked or noticed.”).
60
See Emma Green, The Tide of Hate Directed Against Jewish Journalists,
ATLANTIC (Oct. 19, 2016), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/
10/what-its-like-to-be-a-jewish-journalist-in-the-age-of-trump/504635/ (noting
“[b]etween August 2015 and July 2016, at least 800 journalists received some
19,000 anti-Semitic tweets, sent by 1,600 users,” yet Twitter “only shut down 21
percent of the 1,600 accounts that sent anti-Semitic messages, which accounted for
16 percent of the tweets,” even though Twitter’s Terms of Service explicitly ban the
publishing of anti-Semitic messages); Jonathan Mahler, Anti-Semitic Posts, Many
from Trump Supporters, Surge on Twitter, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 19, 2016),
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/19/us/politics/anti-semitism-trump-supporterstwitter.html (criticizing Twitter for not responding better to a rise of behavior that
infringes the rights of its users).
61
Jonathan Weisman, Why I Quit Twitter — and Left Behind 35,000 Followers,
N.Y. TIMES: TIMES INSIDER (June 10, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/10/
insider/why-i-quit-twitter-and-left-behind-35000-followers.html (detailing how
56
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suggest causation, Twitter’s stock price fell from a closing price of
$29.27/share on August 3, 2015 to $17.66/share on October 28, 2016, a loss
of $11.61/share.62 Conversely, the predicted “social media advertising
average revenue per Internet user in the United States” in the year 2021 is
$86.22; nearly double the $43.23 value from 2015.63 Clearly, the more users
a social media platform has, the more ad income it will make. However, a
social media platform that does not protect the rights of its users risks
alienating its users, leading to disastrous consequences for the platforms.
Therefore, there are clear economic incentives for social media platforms to
protect the rights of its users. The proposed amendment to the Copyright
Act allows social media platforms to do just that.
Further, the proposed amendment to the Copyright Act does not
place any additional burden on the social media platforms. Platforms
already grant themselves a permissive right to monitor and remove content
within the platform. For example, the Instagram Terms of Use state that
“[w]e may, but have no obligation to, remove, edit, block, and/or monitor
Content or accounts containing Content that we determine in our sole
discretion violates these Terms of Use.”64 This right, crafted by the social
media platforms themselves, allows, but does not force, the platforms to
protect the rights of their users within the boundaries of their own
platform.65 To exercise this right, social media platforms necessarily must
take affirmative steps to protect the rights of their users, which costs the
social media platforms money. The proposed amendment to the Copyright
Act does nothing more than expands this right to apply outside the bounds
of the social media platforms. Since the proposed right merely expands an
already existing enforcement device used by social medial platforms, the
social media platforms will simply have to apply the same cost benefit
analysis before using this new right that they already apply before utilizing
the preexisting rights present in the social media platforms’ terms of
service. While large social media platforms could contract with each other
to reciprocally remove copyright-infringing content within their platforms
that originated in other platforms, this would likely impose substantial
transaction costs on the social media platforms. Further, such an agreement
would only bind sites in privity with each other whereas the proposed
Twitter “ignore[d] its own terms of service,” causing a prominent journalist to
“leave [Twitter] behind — along with [his] 35,000 followers”).
62
Twitter Historical Stock Prices, NASDAQ, http://www.nasdaq.com/symbol/twtr/
historical (change the timeframe to show historical quotes going back to 2015).
63
Social Media Advertising Average Revenue per Internet User in the United States
from 2015 to 2021 (in U.S. Dollars), STATISTA, https://www.statista.com/statistics/
459708/social-media-ad-revenue-per-internet-user-digital-market-outlook-usa/ (last
visited Oct. 30, 2016).
64
Instagram TOU, supra note 8 (emphasis added).
65
Id.
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amendment would give social media platforms a right to enforce copyright
infringement against any infringer.66
The proposed amendment does not force social media platforms to
bring copyright infringement suits on behalf of their users. Instead, it
merely allows social media platforms, should they choose, to bring suit
under the Copyright Act as nonexclusive rights holders to protect the
exclusive copyright rights of their users. And while it may seem odd to
classify the ability to bring a costly suit67 on behalf of someone else as a
right, the social media platforms have already identified value in spending
money to protect their users' rights. This is demonstrated by the existence of
“rights” grants like the one identified in the Instagram Terms of Use.
Further, social media platforms like Facebook, which closed with a market
cap of $400.18 billion on March 21, 201768 are better positioned than
individual users69 to bear the high costs of copyright infringement litigation.
Taking the low range of Balganesh’s estimate of the average cost of
litigating a copyright infringement case through trial, such cost is 5.494
times the average household income of a Facebook user.70 This multiple
increases to 28.612 times the average household income for Balganesh’s
upper range figure.71 Compared to these large multiples, the same minimum
and maximum estimates of the average cost of bringing a copyright
infringement case through trial are only 0.000000960 (9.60 x 10-7) and
0.00000500 (5.00 x 10-6), respectively, of Facebook’s March 21, 2017
66

17 U.S.C. § 501(b) (2012) (granting an individual with appropriate standing
under the Copyright Act “to institute an action for any infringement” of a
copyright right (emphasis added)).
67
Balganesh, supra note 10, at 2280 (“As of 2011, the average cost of litigating a
copyright infringement case through trial, for either plaintiff or defendant—
excluding judgment and awards—was estimated to range from $384,000 to a
staggering $2 million.”).
68
Facebook Market Cap, YCHARTS, https://ycharts.com/companies/FB/
market_cap [hereinafter YCHARTS] (mouse over the interactive chart to see the
market cap on March 21, 2017).
69
John Fetto, 10 Consumer Facts About Facebook, EXPERIAN: MKTG. FORWARD
(May 17, 2012), https://www.experian.com/blogs/marketing-forward/2012/05/17/
10-consumer-facts-about-facebook-sim/ (“The average Facebook user claims an
annual household income of $69,900 with annual household spending on
discretionary goods and services of $15,500.”).
70
This value is calculated using the lower cost estimate of litigating a claim,
$384,000, provided by Balganesh, supra note 10, at 2280, and the average
household income, $69,900, from Fetto, supra note 69. Dividing $384,000 by
$69,900 yields 5.494.
71
This value is calculated using the upper cost estimate of litigating a claim,
$2,000,000, provided by Balganesh, Balganesh, supra note 10, at 2280, and the
average household income, $69,900, from Fetto, supra note 69. This calculation
yields 28.612.
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market cap.72 Rather than five to twenty-eight years of salary, these costs
are a mere rounding error to Facebook. Economically, Facebook, like the
other social media platforms, can actually bear the costs of the litigation
required to litigate copyright infringement cases. Doing so may prove
prosperous for the social media platforms, as it could improve user
confidence and usership.73 Yet, the social media platforms will remain
unable to act against the infringement of their users’ content until Congress
amends the Copyright Act.

B. Congress Should Amend the Copyright Act
In 1998, Congress amended the Copyright Act of 1976 by passing
the Digital Millennium Copyright Act. Congress did so “to amend title 17,
United States Code, to implement the World Intellectual Property
Organization Copyright Treaty and Performances and Phonograms Treaty,
and for other purposes.”74 As identified by the Act’s legislative history, one
of these “other purposes” was to “appropriately balance[] the interests of
content owners, on-line and other service providers, and information users
in a way that will foster the continued development of electronic commerce
and the growth of the Internet.”75 The growth of the social media industry
falls squarely within these stated goals.76 As the number of people on social
media continues to grow, the concomitant growth in the amount of
copyrightable subject matter creates more opportunities for copyright
infringement.77 Under current copyright law,78 with the balancing of the
interests of content owners [social media users] and the interests of the
service providers [social media platforms] present in the platforms’ terms of

72

See Balganesh, supra note 10, at 2280; YCHARTS, supra note 68
($384,000/$373.14 billion = 0.00000103; $2,000,000/$373.14 billion =
0.00000536).
73
See Twitter Historical Stock Prices, NASDAQ, http://www.nasdaq.com/symbol/
twtr/historical (change the timeframe to show historical quotes going back to 2016)
(noting Twitter’s stock price increased from an opening price on February 7, 2016
of $18.00 a share to an opening price of $18.77 a share on February 8, 2016 on
news of increased user protection measures).
74
Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998)
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.) (emphasis added).
75
H.R. Rep. No. 105-551, pt. 2, at 21 (1998) (Conf. Rep.).
76
See generally TRACY L. TUTEN & MICHAEL R. SOLOMON, SOCIAL MEDIA
MARKETING (SAGE Publ’ns 2d ed. 2015) (cataloging the continued growth of
usership and e-commerce on social media platforms). See also supra notes 1–2
and accompanying text.
77
See Herzfeld & Melzer, supra note 6 (linking the dramatic increase in social
media usage to an increase in questions surrounding copyright infringement).
78
17 U.S.C. § 502(b) (2012).
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service agreements,79 individual and unsophisticated social media users are
the only parties capable of bringing suits to combat copyright infringement
of their content.80 However, since the average cost of bringing a copyright
infringement suit through litigation can be as high as two million dollars,81
and social media platforms can only challenge infringing content if it is
posted onto their platforms,82 individual users cannot afford to enforce their
rights when their content is infringed. To further advance the goals of the
DMCA, Congress should address this enforcement paradox.
Social media platforms should have the ability to bring these
copyright infringement suits, they should not be required to bring said suits.
If a social media platform wishes to reserve this right, it should have to
indicate as much within its terms of service or terms of use. Change should
come in this form for two main reasons. First, the internal limitations
present in copyright law assuage any fear that this new right would have
negative First Amendment implications. Courts have long recognized that
doctrines like the idea vs. expression dichotomy83 and fair use84 militate
against fears that copyright infringement remedies violate the First
Amendment.85 Following this logic, expanding the class of persons who can
bring copyright infringement suits will not chill free expression. Similarly,
tying this new right to the Copyright Act provides a preexisting procedure
to enforce these rights,86 which will spare Congress the time and effort it
would otherwise take to provide protection to users’ content. By modifying
a single sentence of § 501(b), Congress can increase copyright protection
for social media users by expanding social media platforms’ rights.

CONCLUSION
The current state of copyright law in the United States leads to an
enforcement paradox: those who own exclusive rights to copyrightable
subject matter shared on social media (social media users) have the legal
79

See, e.g., Facebook TOS supra note 13 (granting Facebook a mere nonexclusive
license to user-generated content).
80
17 U.S.C. § 502(b).
81
Balganesh, supra note 10, at 2280.
82
See, e.g., Facebook TOS, supra note 13 (“We can remove any content or
information you post on Facebook if we believe that it violates this Statement or
our policies.” (emphasis added)).
83
17 U.S.C. § 102(b); Comput. Assocs. Int’l Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 703
(2d Cir. 1992) (“It is a fundamental principle of copyright law that a copyright does
not protect an idea, but only the expression of the idea.”).
84
17 U.S.C. § 107.
85
See A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1028 (“We note that
First Amendment concerns in copyright are allayed by the presence of the fair use
doctrine.”). This is especially true when the copiers are not fair users. Id.
86
17 U.S.C. §§ 501–13.
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ability to bring suit in the event the copyright is infringed, but lack the
financial ability to pay the staggering sums required to take a copyright
infringement suit to trial. Conversely, those who own nonexclusive rights to
the copyrightable subject matter shared on social media (social media
platforms) lack the legal ability to bring suit in the event the copyright is
infringed, but have the financial ability to pay the staggering sums required
to take a copyright infringement suit to trial. Fortunately, there is an easy
and low cost solution to solve this paradox – amending 17 U.S.C. § 501(b)
to allow social media platforms that hold nonexclusive licenses in the
copyrightable subject matter generated by their users to bring copyright
infringement suits for the infringement of user-generated content. Such an
amendment will be in the spirit of the DMCA, and will allow United States’
copyright law to address the infringement issues arising out of the
increasing prevalence of social media platforms in modern day life.

